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In the available psychological literature, affect regulation is fundamentally considered
in terms of self-regulation, and according to this standard picture, the contribution of
other people in our affect regulation has been viewed in terms of socially assisted self-
regulation. The present article challenges this standard picture. By focusing on affect
regulation as it unfolds in early infancy, it will be argued that instead of being something
original and fundamental, self-regulation developmentally emerges from the basis of a
further type of affect regulation. While infants’ capacities in recognizing, understanding,
and modifying their own affective states are initially immature and undeveloped, affect
regulation is initially managed by the other: it is initially the self, and not the other,
that plays the role of an assistant in affect regulation. To capture this phenomenon,
the concepts of “auto-matic,” “hetero-matic,” and “altero-matic” affect regulation will
be introduced and their interrelations elaborated. By showing how the capacity of
affective self-regulation, which is characteristic to maturity, is developmentally achieved
by internalizing regulative functions that, at the outset of development, are managed by
the caregiver, it will be argued that altero-matic affect regulation is an autonomous type
of affect regulation and the developmental basis for self-regulation.
Keywords: infancy, interaction, pre-dyadic regulation, dyadic regulation, social referencing, differentiation,
internalization, altero-matic regulation
INTRODUCTION: VARIETIES OF AFFECT REGULATION
Affect regulation refers to the mechanism by which our emotions, moods, feelings, and their
expressions are modulated in pursuit of an affective equilibrium or homeostasis. Its central
relevance for the functioning of the human mind is being increasingly acknowledged in current
scientific research and the topic has been approached from various perspectives. In the ongoing
debate, the focal research interests and questions lie in the biological and evolutionary bases of
affect regulation, in its cognitive underpinnings, in its development, in the correlation between
regulative capacities and various personality features, and in various disorders of affect regulation
as well as in their treatment. Characteristically, affect regulation is understood as “the process of
initiating, maintaining, modulating, or changing the occurrence, intensity, or duration of internal
feeling states and emotion-related physiological processes (. . .) often achieved through effortful
management of attention (. . .) and cognitions that affect the interpretation of situations (. . .) as
well as through neurophysiological processes” (Eisenberg et al., 2000, p. 137). The centrality of the
phenomenon has been highlighted especially by Schore, who has argued that “the core of the self
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lies in patterns of affect regulation that integrate a sense of self
across state transitions, thereby allowing for a continuity of inner
experience” (Schore, 1994, p. 33).
In the vast majority of studies, “affects” are understood
as intrapersonal or intrabodily states, and their regulation is
portrayed in terms of self-regulation: regulation of the self by
the self.1 According to this standard picture, our emotions
and behavior are primarily regulated by our own attention,
our own reactions, by our own cognitive acts and situational
interpretations; in neurophysiological terms, the psychophysical
state of our brain is modulated by our brain itself (e.g., Davidson
et al., 2003; Perlman and Pelphrey, 2010; Siegel, 2012, pp 167ff.).
Whenever external affect-regulative factors or ingredients (such
as a soothing piece of music or the presence of a caring person)
are considered, they are interpreted in terms of mediators or
facilitators of self-regulation. That is to say, even if authors
are today increasingly acknowledging the need to integrate a
social perspective more intimately into the theory of affect
regulation (e.g., Gianino and Tronick, 1988; Schore, 1994, pp
31–33; Totterdell et al., 1998; Parkinson et al., 2005; Niven
et al., 2009; Beckes and Coan, 2011; Siegel, 2012; Butler and
Randall, 2013; Fuchs and Koch, 2014), affect regulation is still
fundamentally considered as a mechanism by which individuals
modulate their own emotions, moods, and feelings (e.g., Gross,
2007). In short, the standard picture holds that, even if external
factors may occasionally be of help, affect regulation nonetheless
fundamentally amounts to regulation of the self by the self.
In the present article, I will be challenging this standard
picture. Even if self-regulation undoubtedly has a relatively
large role in the affect regulation – at least in adult life where
we are held responsible for controlling our affective impulses
and behavior – it might still be that not all affect regulation
is in this sense literally “auto-matic,” i.e., set into motion or
animated (Gr. matos) by something within oneself (Gr. auto-).
To be sure, even “auto-matic” affect self-regulation may be
passive or active (see Niven et al., 2009, pp 498ff.). On the
one hand, it includes modifications that take place involuntarily,
such as the performance-optimalizing functions of the autonomic
nervous system. For instance, when we are mentally overloaded
or feel stressed, the cortisol level in our body automatically
increases, which paces up our heart rate and makes us more alert,
thus making the situation (temporarily) more easily bearable;
and when we are scared, our body “reacts” by increasing the
amount of adrenaline in our circulation thus preventing us
from collapsing or panicking. Experientially speaking, all this
1Self-regulation is sometimes divided into attention regulation, emotion
regulation, and behavioral self-control (including the regulation of bodily
expression; e.g., Forman, 2007, pp 294, 321; Siegel, 2012, pp 299ff.). It is generally
thought that regulation does not change the quality or “valence” of a given affect
(e.g., a painful sensation does not turn into a pleasant sensation), but rather
influences the “dynamics,” one’s “take” on, the affective experience in question
(see Forman, 2007, p. 321): it consists in monitoring, evaluating, and modifying
affectivity, especially its “intensive and temporal features” (Thompson, 1994,
pp 27–28), quantity, frequency, intensity, escalation, and emotional response
(Thompson, 1990). For a discussion on the functional aims of self-regulation, see,
e.g., Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999), Feldman Barrett et al. (2001), Campos
et al. (2004), and Gross (2008). For an extensive overview of the concept of
self-regulation in recent literature, see Burman et al. (2015).
takes place unconsciously, meaning that we only experience the
outcome. On the other hand, auto-matic affect regulation also
includes more active modifications: when we sense a beginning
headache, we might not just wait for our body or brain to take
care of the problem by itself, but we may contribute to the
regulatory process actively by stretching our tightened muscles,
by closing our eyes and resting for a while, by trying to focus
on something else than the pain (perhaps by meditation), or
by taking painkillers, thereby medically erasing the nascent pain
from within.
However, while trying to deal with an unpleasant feeling,
besides modifying ourselves, we may also modify our
environment. That is to say, the self may not only adjust to
the prevalent external circumstances but also actively modify
the latter to better match with one’s current affective moods
and needs. For instance, feeling the nascent headache, we may
dim the bright lights, put on some peaceful music, and so on,
thus engaging in what has been called environmental “niche
construction.” The term derives from the field of biology and
refers to the manner in which organisms may actively transform
their environment to make it fit with their needs – beavers
building dams to enable an optimal ecosystem has been used as
the paradigmatic example of such niche construction (Odling-
Smee et al., 2003; Odling-Smee, 2009; Kendal et al., 2011). Just as
beavers actively manipulate their inanimate surroundings, thus
organizing their vital environment to their “pleasing,” as it were,
we humans do so in various ways as well. Leaving untouched
the question of niche construction by human communities or
human species – a topic that would cover “culture” on the whole –
even examples of individual niche construction alone appear
innumerable. After all, here too one could discuss the whole
scale of human needs: we clothe our body to regulate our body
temperature, we establish a dwelling place to protect ourselves
from environmental threats and changes in the weather, we dress
up (in particular ways) to experience (particular kind of) social
attention, we decorate our apartment to feel at home, we put on
our favorite music to get into a particular mood before going to a
party, and we switch the TV channel whenever the program feels
uncomfortable for one reason or another. Despite the obvious
motivational differences among these cases, all of them seem to
share a common structure: they are all about active manipulation
of one’s immediate experiential environment in pursuing to modify
one’s affective stance. In contrast to what I called “auto-matic
affect regulation” – where regulation is managed by something
within oneself – I will call this “hetero-matic affect regulation,”
since here the regulating source lies outside the boundaries
of oneself (Gr. heteros: different, other-than). Hetero-matic
regulation accordingly amounts to regulation of the self by
something that is not the self.
This is not the whole story, however: there is still a further
type of affect regulation, and the present article will be focusing
on it. This form of regulation is other-based, and I will call
it “altero-matic affect regulation” (Lat. Alter: another, second).2
What I have in mind here is the following. Besides the aesthetic
2Bråten (2007) has coined the concept of “altercentric participation,” which is
related, but not identical with the concept I am introducing here.
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appearance of others (i.e., the way they look, sound, and move)
we are also affected by their subjectivity (i.e., their intentions,
gestures, perceptions, reactions, moods, attitudes, emotional
expressions, verbal reports, etc.), and we tend to be particularly
sensitive when their experiences are directed at us. In everyday
adult life, others function as “social mirrors” for us, and we
tend to be rather sensitive in respect to what we see in the
mirror (see Winnicott, 1971, pp 149ff.; Taipale, 2016b). Much
of this “mirroring” takes place non-verbally: even the most
discrete dynamic shifts in the other’s body language might
betray appreciation, admiration, neutral acceptance, dismay,
disagreement, blame, or overt ignorance (see Honneth, 2001, pp
122ff.), and the way in which we are perceived by others has a
significant influence on how we feel. Standing out in a negative
lighting is an unpleasant experience that we want to avoid; we
care about our “social reputation” (Rochat, 2009, pp 118, 2), and
the more so when it comes to people that personally matter to
us. In this manner, others regulate our affective life. To a certain
extent, just as with the environment, we can actively outline the
nature of affective feedback we get from others. After all, by
regulating what we do and do not let out, we at once outline the
data that will be reflected back on us in the social mirror, and
in this manner we may, to some extent, indirectly regulate our
affective stance through others. Yet, our abilities in making others
feel, think, or act in particular ways are rather limited, and – more
importantly – other people also regulate our affective life without
our initiative.
In this respect the case of infants is particularly interesting.
As the infant’s self-regulatory capacities are initially immature
and undeveloped, the affect-regulative role of the caregiver is
emphasized. Yet, affect regulation has been studied in terms of
self-regulation even when it comes to infants and toddlers (e.g.,
Calkins, 2007, pp 262–264; Hay and Cook, 2007, p. 119): the
caregiver has been viewed as something that, besides the self,
“also” modulates the infant’s affective stance (Thompson and
Goodvin, 2007, p. 322). The caregiver has been explicitly treated
as a mere “facilitator,” “helper,” or “mediator” in this allegedly self-
centered process (e.g., Kopp, 1982, p. 200; Kopp, 1989, p. 345).
Challenging this standard way of thinking, I will argue that in
the very beginning the caregiver not only adds something to
the infant’s own regulative efforts, but rather to a large extent
maintains affect regulation on behalf of the infant: the caregiver
is initially not just in the service of the infant’s affect regulation,
but rather in charge of it. In other words, to a large extent, it is
rather the self and not the other that initially plays the role of an
assistant in affect regulation.
In what follows, I will engage in a developmental investigation
and argue that auto-matic affect regulation arises from, and
presupposes, altero-matic affect regulation. Challenging the
standard view, in which altero-matic affect regulation is reduced
to assisted self-regulation, I will suggest that self-regulation is
gradually enabled along with the process in which the developing
child increasingly internalizes a variety of regulative functions
that are initially handled by the caregiver. Giving more support to
my general claim concerning the fundamentality and autonomy
of altero-matic affect regulation, I will argue that in the infant
the latter tends to assume the form of hetero-matic regulation
only when the care received by the infant is insufficient. Before
concluding, I will illustrate the foundational relationship between
altero-matic and auto-matic affect regulation from the point of
view of psychopathology.
ORIGINS OF SELF-REGULATION
The current research paradigm in developmental psychology
builds largely on data that has been gained when infants are
observed and examined during moments of so-called “alert
inactivity”: the relatively brief periods when they are at their most
cognitive, as it were. The concept of alert inactivity was originally
coined by Wolff (1966), and later on made famous by Stern
(1977, 1985). Moments of alert inactivity occur when an infant
is neither sleeping, hungry, eating, fussing, crying nor engaged in
full activity (Stern, 1985, pp 38–39). During such periods children
perceptually explore their surroundings with neutral curiosity,
almost like scientists. This, as Stern puts it, “provides the needed
time ‘window’ in which questions can be put to newborns and
answers can be discerned from their ongoing activity” (Stern,
1985, p. 39). While the existence of such periods or “time
windows” is undeniable, and while it remains unquestionable
that they take place fairly regularly – characteristically when the
infant has just woken up and is not yet overwhelmed by needs
or sedated by satisfactions – alert inactivity nonetheless is not
the infant’s prevalent way of being, and by considering infants
mainly during such moments therefore does not comprehensively
capture the infant’s experiential world. As far as this is limitation
is acknowledged, there is no problem; contemporary researchers
are continuously discovering remarkable cognitive abilities in
infants, and all these studies deserve to be greeted with praise.
However, problems emerge if one “slides” from speaking of
infants’ experiential capacities and abilities to speaking of their
experiential organization more generally. In this respect, the
formulations are indeed often too careless: instead of reading
that “infants are capable of differentiating between self and other
from birth” it is often said simply that “infants differentiate
between self and other from birth.” Yet, to infer actuality from
potentiality within a limited timeframe is a simple fallacy; the
required conditions for the activation of the respective capacity
(for differentiation) are not secured all the time – and not even
most of the time. The mentioned “slide” is as justified as the
claim that since human beings have the faculty of reason – after
all, we are animal rationale – human life is all the time guided
by reason. (We are not that reasonable.) Likewise, the fact that
there are moments of “alert inactivity,” during which the various
remarkable cognitive capacities of infants are actualized, is not a
sufficient ground for assuming that the latter are operational all
the time. Neutral curiosity is one, but not the dominant, original,
or fundamental experiential mode of the infant3.
The reason for bring this up in the present context is that
situations in which affect regulation is required are, by rule,
3Concerning experiments speaking for the various, remarkable, extroverted
capacities of infants (e.g., experiments of neonatal imitation, still-face experiments,
etc.; e.g., Dondi et al., 1999; Farroni et al., 2004; Rochat, 2004; Nagy, 2008; Reddy,
2008, pp 120–149).
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situations in which the infant is not in the state of “alert
inactivity.” When the infant is haunted by pressing needs,
in plight, feeling uncomfortable, or sedated by overwhelming
satisfactions, neutral curiosity remains impossible – not just
difficult as in adult life – and the infant’s world is rather
organized in the light of her felt needs and satisfactions.
The distinctions fleetingly established, and documented, during
cognitively oriented moments are not initially so deep rooted
that they would, during the first weeks, go on to organize the
infant’s experiential reality also during periods when the infant
is hungry, for instance. In the baby, the sense of hunger is
not present as a subjective topping to the objectively organized
world. As Winnicott puts it, “being hungry is like being possessed
by wolves” (Winnicott, 1964, p. 81): being initially incapable
of seeing beyond the present moment, a hungry baby seems
to behave as if it was the end of the world probably because
she experiences hunger in such a manner – as there is nothing
beyond the currently urging need, it seems to threaten her whole
existence. Moreover, the hungry baby does not care about how the
caregiver feels; she is not a good Kantian who treats the caregiver
as “an end in itself.” The pressing need organizes the infant’s
whole experiential reality, and the caregiver is initially nothing
more than what she is in the light of the infant’s current needs and
wants (Taipale, 2016a). Without taking any worth away from the
magnificent findings that have been made when studying infants
during periods of alert inactivity,4 what I am trying to convey
here is this: in describing the infant’s experiential situation during
affect regulation, we should not take for granted the experiential
distinctions that are clearly manifest during moments of alert
inactivity alone, when the infant is in the mode of neutral
curiosity.
During periods when affect regulation is required
differentiation between self and (m)other is all but clear,
and it comes in degrees.5 Given that I am here focusing on
altero-matic affect regulation, the main categorizing factor that I
will be employing is the level of differentiation between how one
feels and how the other feels. In the following, I will distinguish
three levels in the developmental trajectory of affect regulation:
“pre-dyadic regulation” (see section “Pre-dyadic Regulation”),
“dyadic regulation” (see section “Dyadic Regulation: The
Mirroring Other as a Beacon of Orientation”), and “increasing
self-regulation” (see section “Social Referencing, Internalization,
and Increasing Self-regulation”). These three levels, which surely
also overlap, match with the threefold developmental division
by Donald Winnicott, between “absolute dependency,” “relative
dependency,” and autonomy or “independency” (Winnicott,
1965, p. 46).
Pre-dyadic Regulation
At the very outset, there is what could be called “pre-dyadic
regulation.” The infant does not yet distinguish between how she
herself feels and how the other feels. To exemplify this, consider the
4Elsewhere, I have argued that theories advocating early differentiation and
theories advocating early undifferentiation should be seen as complementary to
one another (Taipale, 2013).
5See Taipale (2016a).
phenomenon of emotional contagion. In a standard setting, when
one baby in the room begins to cry, the other baby in the same
room tends to follow suit. It would not be convincing to maintain
that the second baby is just “empathizing” or “sympathizing” with
the first baby, while maintaining a clear interpersonal distance.
Unlike empathy and sympathy, emotional contagion is “self-
centered” (De Vignemont, 2009, pp 63; cf. Scheler, 2008, pp
23ff.): the baby does not begin to cry because she experiences
sadness out there, as it were, but because she herself feels sad.
Neurophysiologically speaking, this is owing to the second baby’s
functioning mirror resonance system (e.g., Gallese, 2009): the
perceived sadness of the first baby resonates in the affective life of
the second baby, so that the overt sadness, expressed in the cry of
the first baby, is at once felt by the second baby in her own body.
The emotion is thus “carried over” or “transferred” from one baby
to another. What is at stake, however, is not a cognitive confusion:
it would not be convincing to claim that the second baby begins
to cry because she somehow believes or judges that the sad cry of
the first baby is her own (this would not explain why the second
baby, too, begins to cry). Rather than mistaking someone else’s
sadness as her own, the infant senses an emotional presence and
sucks in like a sponge. The feeling that the second baby is infected
by is accordingly not felt by her as someone else’s feeling, but as
her own (Scheler, 2008, pp 37, 15; Zahavi, 2015), and this is not
confusion but an actual experience: the second baby actually feels
sad. If the infant’s experience would be phrased as a question, it
would not be in the active voice including several agents, “How do
I feel in the presence of the other?” but rather more anonymously,
in the passive voice, “How does one feel?”
Importantly, insofar as the experiential setting is not
articulated in terms of a dyad, the infant is initially at the
mercy of the sources of contagion. The feeling always already
infects her, it resonates in her own body, before she “knows
it” and critically asks: “Now whose feeling was this anyway?”
As contagion is rather immediate, and there is no experiential
distance to the influencing affect, the affective environment of
the infant is uncritically taken in, and infants are initially strongly
influenced by their affective surroundings: their feeling, tone, and
mood, depends on the latter. As one can verify from everyday
experience, babies tend to feel distressed when people around
them are distressed, and they tend to feel calmer when people
around them are calm; they catch the mood easily. The affective
environment of the infant is multifarious and overwhelming,
and if the sensory-affective external environment of the infant
would not be organized by keeping an eye on her deficient
affect-regulative capacities, the infant would be injured by the
overwhelming stimuli. The infant’s self-regulatory capacities are
initially immature and undeveloped, and if she is left to deal with
demanding affective situations by herself, the outcome tends to be
dramatic – e.g., in an overtly stressful environment a baby might
withdraw psychologically and flee into apathy.
Here is where the caregiver comes in. In a certain sense, the
infant’s primary caregiver is one source of affective contagion
among others. However, the caregiver’s presence is very early
on distinguished from the presence of other “others” – both
quantitatively and qualitatively. On the one hand, the caregiver
is the prevalent source: at the outset, she is present much more
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continuously than any other source, and the baby’s affective life
is therefore mainly synchronized or attuned precisely with the
caregiver’s affective life.6 On the other hand, the caregiver is
not merely an affective source, an affective “contager” among
others, but also something that has a special relationship with, an
influence on, the rest of the infant’s environment: the caregiver
regulates the infant’s exposition to other affective sources. To
be sure, these sources might not be clearly differentiated from
one another at the outset, but gradually, via repetition, this
special influence or relationship qualitatively distinguishes the
caregiver’s affective presence from the affective presence of other
people.
To be sure, infants do have certain rudimentary means of
affective self-regulation, such as instinctive turning away from
overarousing stimuli (Gergely and Watson, 1996, p. 1186) and
self-soothing thumb sucking. Yet, their capacities in affect
regulation are rather insufficient at the outset, and neither are
they capable of actively re-organizing their environment to their
liking. When there is a bright light, the baby can close her own
eyes, but when a noisy ambulance drives by, it is the caregiver that
covers the baby’s ears. If everything came through, so to speak, the
affective stimuli would easily be overwhelming. The maintenance
of a “window of tolerance” in the infant’s affective life (Ogden
et al., 2006, pp 26–40), a balance “between the accelerator and
the brakes” (Siegel, 2012, pp 167, 315, 389), or “upper and lower
limit control” (Bell, 1968, p. 88; Bell, 1971, p. 67)7 largely depends
on the active role of the caregiver: what the infant cannot yet
accomplish by herself, the caregiver is there to enable, and in
this sense the latter serves as an undifferentiated segment in the
infant’s relatively undeveloped “stimulus barrier” (cf. Kopp, 1989,
p. 346).
Besides the negative, affect-reductive function, the caregiver
also fulfills the infant’s basic needs, thus positively facilitating and
managing the infant’s affective balance. Regulation undoubtedly
begins already before birth; in several ways, the gestational
mother regulates not just the infant’s biological functions but also
the latter’s affective life – what she eats and drinks at once carries
over to how the infant feels, singing and engaging in rhythmic
movements is known to sooth the infant, and if the mother is
distressed the cortisol of her blood also enters the circulation
of the unborn baby. In this sense, there is a continuum, rather
than break, between the infant’s pre-natal and post-natal life:
the caregiver continues to regulate the infant’s affective life. In
favorable circumstances, the newborn infant gradually attaches to
the caregiver: she begins to favor, seek into, and desire for, this
peculiar, increasingly differentiated experiential presence that,
in her experience is, with increasing precision, associated with
affective balance and well-being. However, even if the caregiver’s
affective presence is increasingly differentiated from the presence
of other affective sources – e.g., (the caregiver’s) protective hands
6Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) report: “Infants only 2–3-months old move their
arms in synchrony with their caregiver’s talking rhythm and create synchronous
way of relating to the caregiver.
7As Bell explains, the caregiver’s “upper limit control” aims at modifying the
behavior of the infant, whereas “lower limit control” is directed at stimuli itself:
“In other words, the parent’s control behavior, in a way, is homeostatic relative to
child behavior” (Bell, 1968, p. 88).
vs. the disturbing noise (of the ambulance), – the former might
not yet be clearly differentiated from the infant herself. In other
words, for the infant, affect regulation is not experienced as
altero-matic, other-initiated. Just consider the case of emotional
contagion: what the infected baby is preoccupied with is the
feeling, not the source of the feeling. During times of need, the
caregiver plays the function of a regulative shield, and she might
not be experienced as being anything more than that (Taipale,
2016a). The idea of there being, on the one hand, “feelings in
here” and, on the other hand, “feelings out there” is not an issue at
the outset of extrauterine development – rather, there are simply
feelings that naturally resonate in the infant’s body.
What is said above can be summarized in terms of the
distinction between other-assisted and other-managed affect
regulation: the less developed the infant’s capacities of self-
regulation, the more the caregiver not just assists but manages
the regulation of the infant’s affects. The increasing share of
other-assisted affect regulation in comparison to other-managed
affect regulation is an indication of the infant’s increasing
capacity of self-regulation – it marks a shift, in Winnicott’s
words, from absolute to relative dependence. At the outset,
the infant is “absolutely dependent” on the caregiver: given
her remarkably insufficient abilities in self-regulation (Kopp,
1989, p. 345), without sufficient parental regulation she would
succumb to the chaos of stimuli, she would be controlled by them,
and consequently her development would become irreversively
disturbed.
Dyadic Regulation: The Mirroring Other
as a Beacon of Orientation
A further factor promoting self/other differentiation relates to the
fact that the caregiver’s affective presence is increasingly divided
into such expressions that clearly match, or are attuned, with how
the baby expressly feels, on the one hand, and to those expressions
where such “contingency” is not detected.8 In other words, there
is an increasing differentiation between “engaged” and “non-
engaged” interaction (Reddy and Trevarthen, 2004). Gergely and
Watson use the term “markedness” for the imitative contribution
(or mirroring) within the caregiver’s expression by which she
naturally signals that the infant’s present affective pattern is “seen”
by the caregiver. Mirroring, echoing, or “attunement” is amodal
in nature (Stern, 1985, pp 47ff.). What matters to the infant,
what preoccupies her, is her present affective contour, and it
is less relevant what sense region is emphasized as her feelings
receive their expression. In other words, the infant naturally
expresses her feelings with her whole body, and hence her
audible expression – e.g., “oo-OO-OO-oo” – may be reflected back
not only by a matching sound-pattern, but equally by a visible
gesture that affectively matches the dynamic form of the infant’s
original expression: in fact, perfect imitation of the original
expression (i.e., “aping” it) may even be disturbing or irritating,
aversive rather than inviting, and slightly different but affectively
matching works the best.
8Detection of social contingency has recently been reported already in 2-month-
old infants (Soussignan et al., 2006).
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In engaged or absorbed interaction, parental mirroring takes
place without special effort, and it naturally invites the infant to
actively continue the ongoing interaction.9 The infant reportedly
tends to disengage when the caregiver no longer markedly
mirrors the infant’s affects. This happens when the caregiver’s
attention turns elsewhere – in the midst of interaction she may
exchange a few words with her spouse, become lost in her
thoughts, or start rambling with her smartphone. The break is
decisive: as long as engagement is held up, the infant’s affective
shifts and modes are echoed or mirrored in what she externally
perceives – being surprised or delighted, for instance, is given
immediate “feedback” in the form of a change in the affective
presence of the caregiver. Once engagement is interrupted, how
one feels no longer seems to have any effect in the environment.
For the time being, contingency is gone; the caregiver’s face is no
longer altered by the infant’s natural “invitations,” and she is thus
prone to disengage: “If the mother’s face is unresponsive, then
a mirror is a thing to be looked at but not to be looked into”
(Winnicott, 1971, p. 152). As an extreme case of disengagement,
just consider what happens in the “still face experiment” (see
Tronick et al., 1975).
Via repetition, the infant begins to catch the qualitative
difference between mirroring, attuned, and engaged affective
data, on the one hand, and non-attuned or non-engaged affective
data, on the other. The prominent distinguishing feature lies in
what Gergely and Watson call “contingency detection” (Gergely
and Watson, 1996, pp 1190ff.). The attuned affective data stands
out as that which matches with how I feel; there seems to be a
connection. In adult life, just consider feeling overtly sad and
verbally telling someone about this; your experience will be
remarkably different depending on whether the other person (i)
becomes sad herself and starts to cry, (ii) whether in the other’s
body language you clearly see that she realizes how sad you
are (even if she would not “go along” with your sadness), (iii)
whether she faces you with a neutral and unresponsive expression
(saying mechanistically that she understands how you feel), or
(iv) whether she does not seem to notice you at all. The first case is
a matter of emotional contagion: you find the other being infected
by your emotion and becoming sad herself. It is then her own
sadness that she bodily expresses. By contrast, in the second case
your own sadness is affectively mirrored back to you: unlike in
the first case, what the other’s expression is here taken to convey
is not the other’s feeling but your own: you find your own sadness
receiving expression in the other’s body. In the third case, you
may find your overt emotional state being considered from afar,
perhaps evaluated or contemplated, but not mirrored back to you
in the affective register; the others expression is not affected by
your overt sadness: by maintaining a neutral expression, the other
also maintains an interpersonal distance as if telling you, “I can
see that you are sad.” In the last case, again, your emotion in not
recognized at all: it is as if you were invisible to the other.
What interests us at this point is the second case. Unlike
in the first case, what the other’s expression is here taken to
convey is not the other’s feeling but your own. Differently
9See Rochat (2009, pp 67ff.) on the emergence of “co-awareness” at the age of
6 weeks.
put, the other would not look like this if I did not feel sad;
it is my sadness, and not the other’s sadness, that makes her
look like that, and in this sense the expression that I see
seems to be “contingent” upon how I feel. Gergely and Watson
argue that while, in early infancy, contingency is gradually and
increasingly detected, how the infant herself feels and how the
other feels are gradually differentiated or “decoupled” (Gergely
and Watson, 1996, p. 1198). This discovery paves way to a
significant developmental leap: realizing when it is her own
affective life that is expressed in the other, the child gains and
stabilizes a kind of reflective stance toward her affective life.
To avoid confusion, it is not that what she finds in the other
motivates her to engage in regular (intra-subjective) reflection,
but rather that by looking at the mirroring other, the baby is
already executing a kind of reflection: in engaged interaction
with the mirroring other, she is gradually being taught how she
herself feels.10 Such “teaching” assumes the form of what Gergely
and Watson call “grouping”: various affective contours that
the infant goes through in a non-articulated and pre-symbolic
manner are, via consistent repetition, brought together in the
expressive “feedback” of the mirroring caregiver. To simplify,
the infant’s unpleasant affects (e.g., “UA1,” “UA2,” “UA3,” “UA4,”
“UA5,” “UA6”), which are all expressed by crying, are increasingly
grouped by the mirroring caregiver. As Bowlby puts it, “the
ordinary sensitive mother is quickly attuned to her infant’s
natural rhythms and, by attending to the details of his behavior,
discovers what suits him and behaves accordingly” (Bowlby,
1988, p. 10). That is to say, “reading” her infant well, the
caregiver’s mirroring response for “UA1,” “UA3,” and “UA4”
differs from her mirroring response to “UA2,” “UA5,” and “UA6,”
and hence, via repetition, the child gradually learns to categorize
her unpleasant affective feelings into two kinds of unpleasant
affective states (e.g., “UA1,” “UA3,” and “UA4” falling under
“feeling of pain,” and “UA2,” “UA5,” and “UA6” under “feeling
of hunger”). And gradually her expressions and actions begin to
differentiate accordingly.11 The downside to this dependence is
that if some of the child’s affects are not properly mirrored back –
e.g., because they are considered forbidden by the parent – they
will most likely remain unarticulated and ambiguous for the child
as well, which is prone to give rise to difficulties in later life.
The capacity to dissect one’s affective life into clearly outlined
categorical states is a later developmental achievement. Even if
infants seem to naturally distinguish pleasurable affects from
unpleasant ones, they hardly divide their affects into two clearly
separate categories – and it would be even less convincing to
claim that they initially categorize their unpleasant affective
modes into states of “anger,” “hunger,” “pain,” “tiredness,” or
“fear,” for instance. Before the infant learns to articulate and track
10This reflecting or “monitoring” is crucial in the development of regulative
capacities: “Emotion regulation emerges in concert with children’s developing
understanding of emotion and its meaning” (Thompson and Goodvin, 2007,
p. 322). Moreover, along with this, the infant learns to increasingly co-regulate her
affects with the caregiver (Gianino and Tronick, 1988; Beebe and Lachmann, 1998).
11Fonagy and Target (2005, p. 339) discuss this phenomenon in terms of the
caregiver’s “reflective function,” and claim that “mothers with high reflective
function possess greater capacity to regulate the baby’s fear, interacting with her
without frightening or otherwise disorganizing the baby.”
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(along with the above-mentioned “reflection”) her affective life in
terms of specific affective “states,” her affective life already runs its
course in the form of pre-reflective affective contours and tones –
a phenomenon captured by the concept of “vitality affects.” The
latter amount to the dynamic patterns of affective experiencing
on the whole (Stern, 1985, pp 55ff.; Stern, 2010, pp 41–42), e.g., to
the “crescendo” or “decrescendo” in bodily expression; they are
affective states in their pre-reflective (pre-grouped) givenness.
Such indeterminacy initially characterizes the infant’s affective
self-awareness, and the attuned caregiver amodally reflects
back, and reacts to, their affective pattern or style, instead
of considering them as fixed affective states. Gradually, the
infant thus learns to thematize to objectify, affective dynamic
patterns into particular “affective states.” That is to say, owing
to parental mirroring, instead of simply feeling in a non-
articulated manner, the infant gradually learns to track how she
feels.12 And affect regulation crucially develops “in concert with
children’s developing understanding of emotion and its meaning”
(Thompson and Goodvin, 2007, p. 322). The parent is, in this
fundamental sense, a “beacon of orientation” (see Mahler et al.,
1975, p. 7): her mirroring expressions significantly teach the
infant how she feels, thus serving as a guide in the midst of
affective turmoil.
Social Referencing, Internalization, and
Increasing Self-regulation
The caregiver’s contribution to affect regulation at the outset
of development can hardly be overestimated. At the outset, the
caregiver largely manages the affective input of the baby, both by
regulating his or her own affects and by actively steering (both
negatively and positively) the infant’s exposure to other affective
sources in the environment. As the dyad is increasingly formed
and stabilized along with the differentiation between the caregiver
and the environment, the infant begins to differentiate between
expressions that reflect the caregiver’s own affective states, on the
one hand, and marked expressions that mirror her own affective
modes. This differentiation enables the infant to recognize, with
increasing precision, her occurring feelings – to monitor them,
to reflect upon their relationship with other affects, and hence to
categorize and distinguish between them. This marks a decisive
step in the development of the ability of self-regulation.
A further mirroring function of the caregiver is still to be
discussed. As the infant becomes more skilled in distinguishing
the caregiver’s mirroring expressions from expressions that reflect
the caregiver’s own feelings, she also becomes increasingly
sensitive to the way in which her affects are mirrored.
The infant gradually learns to differentiate between two
modes of mirroring: those signaling situational approval and
those signaling situational disapproval. Along with increasing
differentiation in this respect, the parent gains a normative
significance: the caregiver’s face indicates not just how one feels,
but also whether how one should presently feel (i.e., whether or
12For an analogy in adult life, consider looking at a mirror and realizing that you
look tired; consider, moreover, that you had not explicitly categorized your feeling
as “tiredness,” even if you felt tired already; now, looking at a mirror, you see how
tired you look, and this makes you realize that you indeed are tired.
not this spontaneous feeling or reaction is appreciated in current
circumstances). In other words, the caregiver is a “beacon of
orientation” not just in the descriptive but also in the normative
sense: besides consulting the caregiver while seeking an answer to
the question, “How do I feel?,” the infant now increasingly seeks
an answer to the question, “How should I feel?”
This issue has been discussed under the rubric of “social
referencing” (e.g., Feinman, 1992). Social referencing refers to the
act of assessing the reactions of significant others and seeking
guidance in them, in order to determine how to act, think, or
feel in a particular situation. Unlike in adult social life, where
the phenomenon is also widely operative, in the very first forms
of social referencing – emerging usually by the end of the first
year (Gergely and Watson, 1996, p. 1187) – the experience tends
to be much more suggestive. Consider the case in which a 9-
month-old baby is about to take a step without support, and just
before doing so turns to consult the caregiver’s facial expression.
In the words of Gergely and Watson, the infant might be “actively
seeking out a clarifying affect-mirroring cue from the parent
that will result in the strengthening and coming to dominance
of one of the conflicting emotion-states he/she is currently in,
thereby resolving his/her indecision” (ibid.). The infant clearly
wants to take a non-supported step but feels afraid in the face
of the uncertain outcome, and to resolve her affective indecision,
she consults the parent’s face – not in order to know how she
herself already feels (or to know how the caregiver feels), but to
know how she herself should feel. If the adult looks uncertain and
afraid, the infant tends to give up the idea, and if the parent
is overtly supporting, smiling and “giving a green light,” the
infant will more easily try taking an unsupported step. What the
parent’s expression here regulates is the infant’s affective stance
(and, therefore, her action as well). Likewise, whenever the infant
harmlessly falls and bumps herself to the floor after a failed
first try, she is prone to consult the parent – and, again, if the
latter stays calm (perhaps making a markedly funny face and
saying “whoops!”) the child also will much more likely feel calm
about what happened and reacts less dramatically than when
the parent is overtly terrified and concerned. Besides future-
oriented suggestions, social referencing is also used to evaluate
something that has already taken place; instead of consulting
the caregiver, asking, “Is this OK?,” the infant also consults the
caregiver, asking, “Was this OK?” Consider that at a dinner table
a toddler deliberately pours a full glass of milk onto the table,
cheerfully smiles and titters, and then carefully turns toward the
caregiver (as if for consultation, “How about that?”). The affective
impact upon the child is different depending on whether the
caregiver just smiles and laughs along, thus signaling approval, or
whether she recognizes the infant’s cheerfulness, but holds a more
serious look, thus signaling that deliberately messing up with food
is not a laughing matter.
Now, along with the increasing capacity to track how she
feels, the infant begins to anticipate dyadic mirroring of her
affective experiences: parental mirroring is gradually internalized.
Consider an infant who is learning to walk, and who, each day,
falls dozens of times. Consider that the infant does not hurt
herself that badly, and that her caregiver greets her efforts with
soothing encouragement (“It’s ok, just try again”). After a while,
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when the infant falls, she already knows to expect such soothing
encouragement, and her affective reaction to falling down is, in
this sense, less dependent upon actual parental consultation –
she no longer each time seeks the gaze of the parent and,
at some point, does not any longer require the caregiver’s
actual presence to feel the soothing encouragement: “It’s ok,
just try again.” Negative situational mirroring patterns become
likewise internalized. Consider the milk-pouring example: by
being consistently mirrored with a negative tone each time she
deliberately pours her milk glass, the child gradually internalizes
the situation-dependent blame, and is able to anticipate the
unpleasant outcome. In this manner the child becomes learned
in what could be called preventive affect regulation: avoiding
situations usually leading to unpleasant other-based affects (such
as blame or shame).
Internalization of affect mirroring enables a leap in the
child’s capacities in affective self-regulation: the child increasingly
follows social expectations also in the absence of external
monitors, and she leans on the internalized presence of the altero-
matic regulator also when the latter (the caregiver) is not actually
present (cf. Kopp, 1982, p. 206; Kopp, 1989, p. 350).13 Consider
the behavior of a child that is put to sleep. During the first
months of life, when the continual presence of the caregiver is
needed, the infant easily begins to cry when she is laid down
and left alone. Gradually, however, she cries less and less in such
situations, and at a certain age, instead of crying, thus actively
calling the actual parent to sooth her, the infant increasingly
learns to keep herself company, as it were – e.g., she “babbles”
or “chatters” by herself, she holds on to and hugs her familiar soft
toy, etc. This capacity to be alone for a while marks an important
developmental achievement: the presence of the actual caregiver
in flesh and blood is no longer continually required, because the
infant has internalized her and carries her with her, as it were.
When the caregiver is not actually present, the infant is able
to endure the felt absence by playfully invoking her presence.
This is not a matter of hallucination or memory: the child does
not posit, actually believe in, the real existence of the caregiver
(e.g., if the caregiver actually re-enters the room, the child hardly
experiences this as the arrival of a second caregiver), whereas on
the other hand she does not refute the caregiver’s existence either
(in this case, the “created” presence would hardly be soothing).
For an analogical experience in adult life, just consider watching
a thriller movie: when you are absorbed in the film, you might
feel afraid when in the film a murderer suddenly jumps from
the closet, but when that happens you do not normally call the
police (i.e., watching a movie you do not truly judge that there
is actually a murderer in front of you); on the other hand, if you
treat the thriller as a being only a movie, and judge the murderer
not actually being there, you would not be afraid and could not
enjoy the movie. Likewise, the infant playfully, spontaneously,
re-enacts the caregiver’s presence, without making existential
judgments one way or the other, as it were – questions of actuality
remain undecided (Winnicott, 1971, pp 17–18; Scheler, 2008,
p. 24).
13Consequently, the child may feel shame over something that she does in privacy
or even over her mere thoughts: a sheer idea of others perceiving us suffices.
Insofar as the infant carries the primary caregiver within
her, she is increasingly capable of affect regulation also outside
the infant–caregiver dyad. Gradual internalization thus slowly
facilitates the infant’s process of separation from the primary
caregiver, thus preparing a way toward independence (also)
with respect to affect regulation. Gradually differentiating herself
from the primary caregiver enables further dyadic relationships:
other people, too, are constituted as social mirrors, and different
people reflect the child’s affective states differently. Increasingly
differentiating between these alternative self-evaluations, she also
begins to favor some over others. For example, knowing that
her mom is stricter about cookies, the child tends to ask her
dad whether she could have one more – her dad is expected to
mirror her desire in a more approving lighting. More generally,
as the child gains more reflective surfaces to her feelings and
impulses, alternative perspectives to the appropriateness and
inappropriateness of her affective expressions, her social self-
awareness and situational prudence become gradually structured.
By entering the social world, the child no longer uncritically
takes the caregiver as the norm of how one should feel in
such-and-such circumstances, and in this sense she grows
more independent: by internalizing alternative social mirrors,
as it were, she also learns to disagree with the primary
mirror. To know how she is expected to feel, the child no
longer exclusively consults the (actual or internalized) caregiver;
her question is rather more social and general: “How am I





We are now in the position to systematically examine the
relationship of altero-matic regulation to auto-matic and hetero-
matic regulation, and argue that it is a sui generis form of
regulation. The basic reason why altero-matic regulation cannot
be reduced to assisted self-regulation is that in early infancy the
child’s subjective regulative capacities are remarkably insufficient.
To think that all that the parent does is to support the infant’s
self-regulation is as reasonable as saying that a parent “supports”
a teenager in cleaning her own room by cleaning it herself.
Infants are born helpless: they enter the world in a state of
absolute dependency (Winnicott, 1965, p. 46), meaning that the
caregiver is initially there not just to assist the infant’s auto-matic
regulatory processes, but to manage them (Kopp, 1989, p. 345).
The infant’s dependency on the caregiver gradually decreases
as she increasingly internalizes the regulative functions of the
caregiver. Emerging independence in this respect enables the
infant to begin to “make use of” other people for self-regulative
purposes. That is to say, what I hope to have shown above is
that whenever altero-matic regulation is considered in terms of
assisted self-regulation (as it mostly is in the literature), a long
and complex developmental process is already presupposed: a
process in which the subject is at first dependent on the regulating
presence of the caregiver. In short, auto-matic affect regulation is
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founded upon altero-matic affect regulation, and the latter hence
cannot be reduced to the former.
Partly for the same reasons, altero-matic regulation cannot be
reduced to hetero-matic regulation. For one, the infant is initially
unskilled in body-control, and she herself is at first simply unable
to adjust the environment to fit her moods and needs.14 Yet, even
as the child develops, enters into adulthood, and becomes capable
of “using” the environment to regulate her affects, this, by rule,
requires intentional activity: the environment does not adjust
to one’s moods and needs by itself, even if it does not in itself
resist active manipulation either. In this respect, altero-matic
regulation structurally differs from hetero-matic regulation in
two senses: the other is not just passive but active and might hence
both (1) resist our attempts of manipulation and (2) regulate
our affects without any intentional activity on our part. The first
phenomenon is familiar from our everyday social life, where
the gap between our own affective life and the affective life of
others is relative clear: we might ask the other to do something,
but the outcome is, in principle, unsure. By contrast, a stereo
equipment does not have plans of its own; when we want to hear
our favorite song, we can just put it on. The second phenomenon
is likewise characteristic to everyday social life, though more
emphatic in infantile experience. The stereo equipment does not
track our emotional states, and function accordingly without any
intentional activity on our part, but the other person might see
that we are sad, for instance, invite us to talk about it, or put on
our favorite song, thus in various ways “mirroring” our feelings
without asking for our permission. That is to say, without any
active effort on our part, others may regulate our affects, and they
may do this either directly or by modifying our environment.
In certain circumstances, however, significant other persons may
themselves be present as figures within the environment. In a
favorable developmental setting, care can be taken for granted
(Taipale, 2016a): the infant does not usually have to beg and beg
for the caregiver to react to her needs and wants; from the most
discrete signals the “primarily preoccupied” caregiver (Winnicott,
1984, pp 300ff.) often recognizes her infant’s needs already before
the infant herself knows what is it that is beginning to bother her –
and acts accordingly. In good cases, then, care arrives without
active effort and the caregiver is not present as someone that has
to be manipulated in order to achieve affective relief. Care comes
without “asking,” and the self is rather passive vis-à-vis the affect-
soothing object. If, by contrast, care is not sufficiently continuous
and consistent – i.e., not “good-enough” – the infant is forced
trying to actively influence the caregiver, and while partly failing
to do so, the care appears to be something that one cannot take
for granted – this promotes early separation which has harmful
consequences to the subsequent emotional development.
The affect-regulative effect of the affectively mirroring other is
reportedly qualitatively different from affect regulation by a non-
responsive object – even when the latter, too, is a living being.
In a now classical “double video” study, Murray and Trevarthen
(1985) reported that already in their third month infants are
able to discriminate between a live video of their mother (who
14As is noted by Derryberry and Rothbart (2001), at the outset, intrasubjective
affect regulation is guided primarily by intrinsic (neuro)physiological factors.
at the same time sees the infant in another screen) from a
recorded videotape (cf. Nadel et al., 1999). Using similar settings,
several researchers have argued that infants are significantly more
interested in their mother during a live feedback than during a
replay sequence (e.g., Muir and Nadel, 1998, pp 256–259; Nadel
and Tremblay-Leveau, 1999, pp 195–200; Stormark and Braarud,
2004). Such studies suggest that engaged, mirroring presence
significantly differs from non-mirroring presence very early on;
when the caregiver disengages, the infant tends to disengage
too. This nicely fits with what has been said above, namely that
whenever the other is not engaged with oneself, in her affective
presence she moves into the background, becomes part of the
affective environment, that has to be actively manipulated to have
the desired affective impact. To apply and generalize this idea:
listening to an audiobook and listening to someone reading a
book to you has a different effect, and to “baby-sit” a child by
making her watch a television program is not quite the same as
live interpersonal interaction (even if extremely capturing). In
live interaction, the storyteller adjusts to the child’s expressions,
gestures, and reactions, aligns and attunes with the reception of
the fairytale; a cartoon, by contrast, does not care about how
this particular child feels while watching it. The decisive feature
distinguishing altero-matic and hetero-matic affect regulation
is accordingly not in the distinction animate/inanimate but in
the distinction between mirroring and non-mirroring objects.
Whenever an object does not mirror one’s affective states, it is
not present as an interacting other, but part of one’s affective
surroundings.
One further distinguishing feature is worth highlighting as it
supports the claim of the sui generis nature of altero-matic affect
regulation: in the latter, the actual presence of the regulator is
not necessary. Once the presence of the other is internalized, it
continues to play its affect-regulative role also when the other is
absent. In the case of auto-matic and hetero-matic regulation, the
presence of the regulator is required. My headache is not altered
simply by the possibility of stretching, by the possibility of taking
a painkiller, nor is my stress relieved simply by the possibility of
listening to some Bach or Haydn, or merely thinking about my
favorite song15, but the sheer possibility or thought that others (or
a particular other) may see me stealing something, for instance,
even if I am sure they presently do not, may give rise to enormous
guilt. In fact, some people that are (presently or permanently)
absent may even have a stronger influence on the organization
of our affective life than those that are actually present at the
moment.
Yet, even if the parent is gradually “internalized,” and becomes,
in a way, one social mirror among many, the (internalized)
caregiver is not just a mirror, to rephrase Winnicott, but
also the “precursor” of the mirror, and the way that one
is mirrored in early childhood largely colors the way one
expects oneself to be viewed later on (Winnicott, 1971, p. 149).
Given the developmental roots of auto-matic affect regulation
in internalized altero-matic affect regulation, what the infant
15To be sure, I can be taking a placebo painkiller for my headache, and that might
in some cases, make me feel better, but this does not work if I simply imagine,
recollect, or fantasize about taking a painkiller.
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internalizes in the earliest developmental stages is destined
to largely outline her capacities in affective self-regulation.
Favorable development is not a given here: early interaction and
the type of attachment in a way sketch a developmental direction,
even if not a determinate “fate,” for subsequent self-regulation.16
I have up until now presupposed that the care received by the
infant is good-enough. If, by contrast, the child is not mirrored
properly, or is mirrored ambiguously or mainly negatively, a
lot is at stake: along with the insufficient capacity to learn to
control one’s own affect, the whole emotional development of
the child is distorted. Ainsworth et al. (1978), Bowlby (1988,
pp 140ff.), Main et al. (2005), distinguish various “attachment
patterns” in early development, each of which offers a particular
kind of basis for the subsequent development of self-regulation:
(1) secure, (2) avoidant, (3) resistant or ambivalent, and (4)
disorganized or disoriented attachment (cf. Siegel, 2012, p. 97ff.).
The division is established from the basis of the so-called “strange
situation test,” which measures the child’s capacity to adjust to
new circumstances when the parent leaves the scene. In our
terms, then, the test tracks precisely the developmental stage of
self-regulation in the absence of altero-matic regulation.
In secure attachment (or, as we could also say, in secure
altero-matic affect regulation), the caregiver is attuned to the
infant’s affective life. Holding attachment in value, the caregiver
is emotionally available, perceptive and responsive to his or her
infant. In such a setting, the infant is consistently perceived,
understood, and responded to by the caregiver (Bowlby, 1988,
p. 140; Ogden et al., 2006, pp 47ff.; cf. Siegel, 2012, pp 99–
101). The child’s “beacon of orientation” is a stable, consistent,
and reliable standpoint, and as she gradually internalizes the
former, her capacities in self-regulation are provided with optimal
developmental conditions, insofar as the infant does not have to
compensate the lacking altero-matic regulation with immature
and hence dramatic self-regulative efforts. By contrast, whenever
altero-matic affect regulation has been remarkably insufficient
one way or the other, problems tend to ensue. If the altero-matic
regulator is not reliable or consistent, for instance, to maintain
her emotional balance the child’s own regulatory efforts come to
compensate or complement the respective insufficiency.
In avoidant attachment, the parent is incoherent, emotionally
unavailable, imperceptive, unresponsive, and dismissive, and the
infant’s altero-matic affect regulation is thus insufficient: her
affective states are not properly mirrored or reflected in the
parent, and the child usually reacts by less easily externally
revealing how she feels.17 Interestingly, Main et al. (2005, esp.
275–276) have reported that while both securely and avoidantly
attached infants were later on equally capable of categorizing
their negative feelings, the avoidantly attached children were
less skilled in dealing with the negative emotion in question.
In the avoidant attachment pattern, the regulation of external
expression is heightened: to avoid shame arising from the
16On the retrospective significance of early development of affect regulation, see
also Thompson and Goodvin (2007, pp 324ff.; cf. Noller, 2005).
17In terms of Hill-Sonderlund et al. (2008, pp 262ff.), the child is thus carrying a
greater “allostatic load” (Hill-Soderlund et al., 2008). On the imbalance between
the child’s nervous system responses (measured by heart rate variability) and her
external behavior, see Fox and Hane (2008, pp 222ff.) and Siegel (2012, pp 120ff.).
(repeated) situation in which one spontaneously expresses one’s
feelings but is not seen (or worse: is humiliated), the child tends
to become rather cautious in respect to what she externally
reveals, and this complementary deliberation may assume the
form of what Winnicott calls a narcissistic false self organization
(Winnicott, 1965, pp 140ff.; Bowlby, 1988, p. 140).
In ambivalent attachment, the parent is inconsistently and
unpredictably available, sensitive, perceptive, and responsive
(Bowlby, 1988, p. 140; Ogden et al., 2006, p. 50). The parent
might try to bond with the child, but in a way that is not
contingent to the child’s communication but to the parent’s
(see Siegel, 2012, p. 128). The parent is prevalently present
in an ambivalent manner, neither consistently engaged nor
consistently disengaged.18 In classical psychoanalytic terms, in
secure attachment the parent enables an extensive period of
omnipotence for the infant, whereby the infant’s affective life
is organized as something that has a social, real, impact in the
world; in avoidant attachment, the unresponsive parent remains
in the background, and the infant tends to become separated
rather early on, before the sense of her social relevance is
properly established; and in ambivalent attachment the child has
grown in a setting in which she has not been able to be sure
whether her feelings will be seen, acknowledged, overlooked,
or rejected. As compensation, the child’s attachment system
becomes “overactivated,” as it were: the child is hungry for
interaction and is desperately seeking it, even when the parent
is engaged, as if to ensure the continuation of engagement.
To internalize such a “beacon” tends to entail imbalanced
emotional development: if the “precursor of the mirror,” the
primary regulator, is ambiguous, this ambiguity will be, along
with internalization, carried over to the self.19 Basic sense of
insecurity is compensated with a desperate, insatiable search for
security.
Finally, disorganized attachment is given rise when the child
grows up in an intensively frightening environment (Main
and Solomon, 1990): she is continuously physically abused,
mistreated, or neglected, or mirrors herself in a parent who is
herself caught up with an unresolved trauma or object-loss which
has left him or her drifting aloof from the surrounding reality
or made her psychotic. The horror of the situation lies in the
fact that, even if the child fears for her life, she has nowhere else
to flee but toward the source of her distress. In the unbearable
situation, where actual escape is not possible, the child has no
other means but to flee mentally and detach herself from what’s
really happening. If the condition is continuous, a rule rather
than an exception, the possibility of later dissociative disorders
and psychoses increases: the mind of the child threatens to split
into various disconnected realms (see van der Hart et al., 2006,
pp 6–7; Liotti, 1992). In short, a disorienting “beacon” is really
not a beacon at all, and to internalize something like that is to be
at a loss.
18Often, there are two primary caregivers, and if they respond to the child in a
very different manner, their presence may be ambivalent when considered as unity.
Insofar as the emotional responses of the parents are not too divergent from one
another, the infant’s affective self-presence is organized more or less coherently.
19Insufficient self-regulation has also been linked with hyperactivity and inability
to inhibit inappropriate behavior (Forman, 2007, p. 294).
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In this manner, developmental psychopathology can
illuminate the relation of dependence between auto-matic and
altero-matic regulation, and hence also highlight the difference
between them. Altero-matic regulation cannot be reduced to an
assisted form of auto-matic regulation. By contrast, hetero-matic
regulation can sometimes be considered as a mediated form of
self-regulation: environment does not adjust itself to my needs;
intentional activity is required for this. When I put on music to
get into a particular mood, I initiate the affective modification
even if the environment functions as the primarily affective
source. However, as has been said above, my environment can
be manipulated also by other people. In such cases, hetero-
matic regulation would not be reducible to (an indirect form
of) auto-matic regulation, but to (an indirect form of) altero-
matic regulation. Given the complexity of everyday social life,
all these forms, along with their indirect variants, have a share
in our affective life, and it may be hard to distinguish them
from one another. Yet, given the developmental primacy of
altero-matic regulation, and the fact that auto-matic regulation is
largely derived from the latter, we can maintain that altero-matic
regulation is an original phenomenon.
CONCLUSION
I have here suggested that the standard picture, according to
which affect regulation is interpreted in terms of (assisted) self-
regulation is misleading, because the latter is developmentally
based on another type of regulation: the manner in which
we are capable of regulating our affects – whether directly
or by modifying the environment – largely depends on the
developmental course of what I have called altero-matic affect
regulation. Venturing through pre-dyadic and dyadic forms of
early affect regulation, I showed how self-regulation becomes
increasingly independent as the developing child gradually
internalizes the regulative functions that are initially managed
by the caregiver. In this manner, self-regulation is gradually
established from the basis of altero-matic affect regulation, and
altero-matic regulation therefore cannot be reduced to assisted
self-regulation. Self-regulation becomes possible thanks to a
particular kind of altero-matic affect regulation, which makes it
understandable that if something goes wrong in the latter, the
traces of this are to be found, even if only later on, in the former.
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